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Abstract 
 
This study examines the extent of information about hedging activities disclosures within the 
annual reports of Main Market companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The extent of hedging 
activities disclosures is captured through a 32-item-template, which consists of a mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure scores. The results of this study indicate that the extent of 
information on hedging activities disclosure is still insufficient among the sampled 
companies even though the disclosure scored is quite high. This study also examines the 
relationship between the existence of risk management committee (RMC), its characteristics 
and the extent of information on hedging activities disclosure in two separate statistical 
models. The regression results imply that the existence of RMC is positive but does not 
significantly influence the extent of information on hedging activities disclosure.  However 
its characteristics (i.e. RMC independence and RMC meeting) have a significant influence. 
The findings may provide some meaningful insights to regulators, policymakers and 
researchers, towards the establishment of RMC as a part of the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. In addition to its existence, the effectiveness of RMC also needs to 
be emphasized. 
 
Key words: Derivatives; Disclosure Index; Financial Instruments; Hedging Activities; Risk 
Management Committee (RMC) 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous studies explained that derivatives may be used for three reasons; risk management, 
income generation, and financial engineering. Although derivatives may have different 
roles, many research have reported that companies frequently employ derivatives as an 
instrument for corporate risk management (e.g. Ameer, 2010; Grant and Marshall, 1997; 
Mallin et al., 2001). In other words, derivatives are used as a mechanism to offset financial 
risk exposure caused by business activities (Stulz, 2004). According to Chung and Fung 
(1995), although derivatives are able to offset companies’ financial risk exposure, improper 
and weak internal policies towards the use of derivatives may lead companies to suffer huge 
losses. As previously indicated, financial risks associated with hedge arrangements 
contributed to the collapse of several prominent corporate companies such as Enron and 
PLC. With regard to these corporate failures, several studies have urged for more 
information about risks from hedge activities, particularly from the use of derivatives (see 
Birt et al., 2013; Hassan et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2008). It was claimed that users of 
financial statements must understand and have enhanced information in evaluating 
companies’ use of derivatives.  
 
Ameer (2010) argued that a need exists for users (especially investors) to understand the risk 
exposure and risk management activities carried out by companies including the hedging 
objective and its cost and relate their descriptions of risk management to disclosures of 
quantitative information. According to Papa and Peter (2013), insufficient derivative 
disclosures or limited transparency (i.e. either designated or non-designated for hedging) can 
result in an investor undervaluing the risk of reporting entities and lead to flawed investment 
decisions as being involved in derivatives can increase a company’s risk exposure.  
 
The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has introduced a new accounting 
standard to improve derivative information sharing and enable users to reach more informed 
investment conclusions. In Malaysia, IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures) became 
in effect on January 1, 2010 and was renamed MFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures). 
However, while business entities have just relatively applied MFRS 7 in Malaysia, several 
studies in other countries have raised concerns regarding the extent and quality of the 
disclosure companies provide in meeting this accounting standard (e.g. Birt et al., 2013; 
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Hassan et al., 2006; Lopes and Rodriques, 2007; Wei and Taylor, 2009). One concern is 
related to information about derivative and hedge activities, which some have claimed to be 
less useful and subject to management discretion (Bamber and Meeking, 2010; Hassan et 
al., 2012; Hausin et al., 2008; Papa and Peter, 2013). This is because the accounting standard 
offers an optional requirement for hedge accounting to be applied by companies.  
 
Previous studies (i.e. Abdullah and Chen, 2010; Birt et al., 2013; Hassan et al., 2012) have 
proposed that the establishment of a Risk Management Committee (RMC) could influence 
the level of transparency and quality of disclosure of financial instruments. Since there is 
mixed evidence to support this assertion, this study further queries about the effectiveness 
of  RMC in doing so particularly on the information about derivatives and hedge activities. 
It is argued that the mere existence of RMC is insufficient and its effectiveness should be of 
more concern and emphasized to justify the quality of such disclosures. To examine its 
effectiveness, the present study uses the characteristics (i.e. size, independence, diligence, 
diversity and expertise) of RMC as a proxy for its effectiveness. Hence, the objectives of 
this study are to examine the extent of hedging activities information and the influence of 
the risk management committee and its characteristics to the level of hedging activities 
information disclosure in annual reports of selected Malaysian-listed companies. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2.0 outlines the prior research on financial instruments 
disclosure. Section 3.0 discusses the research hypotheses, while chapter 4.0 discusses the 
research design. Section 5.0 presents the results on the extent of hedging activities disclosure 
as well as the results of hypothesis testing. The last section of this paper presents the 
conclusions and future research opportunities. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Studies on Financial Instruments Disclosures 
Although many studies have examined reporting practices on financial instruments, only a 
limited number of studies have specifically addressed the disclosure of information on 
derivatives. As information on derivatives and hedge activities is part of financial instrument 
disclosure, this section reviews related past studies on the disclosure of financial instruments, 
emphasizing disclosure of information on derivatives and hedging activities. In general, 
studies prior to the existence of regulations showed that the disclosure of financial 
instruments including information on derivatives was unsatisfactory as many companies 
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under study limited the amount of their disclosure. However, a higher level of disclosures 
was reported after regulations were created but the information provided was not always 
useful. Several factors could help explain the level of financial instruments disclosure. 
Studies conducted before the issuance of accounting standards showed that the level of 
financial instruments disclosure was associated with several specific characteristics. 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) provided evidence on some drivers that help in voluntary 
financial instruments disclosure. These factors are companies’ affiliations with professional 
bodies, company size, type of industry and the extent of its media attention. Similarly, Lopes 
and Rodriquez (2007) provided evidence that company size, type of industry and auditor 
listing status were significantly related to the extent of disclosure among Portuguese-listed 
companies. In contrast, Hassan et al. (2006) gave a different view on this matter. They 
reported that large companies and companies with high price-earnings ratios and debt-to-
equity ratios provided more transparent and higher quality financial instrument disclosures. 
Wei and Taylor (2009) showed that the strength of corporate governance and leverage were 
significant factors that positively influenced the disclosure of fair value information on 
financial instruments. Similarly, Taylor et al. (2008) reported that the level of financial 
instruments disclosure, including information on hedging activities, was positively 
associated with leverage and strength of corporate governance. In another study, Birt et al. 
(2013) showed that the extent of disclosure of financial instruments was significantly 
associated with profitability, leverage, the type of audit firm, company size and the existence 
of a risk management committee. They found that a large profitable company with high 
leverage and audited by a Big 4 auditor was likely to provide more extensive disclosure of 
financial instruments. In contrast to Birt et al. (2013), Nejad et al., (2013) found no 
relationship between a risk management committee and the level of financial instruments 
disclosure among companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.  
 
In Malaysia, limited studies have addressed disclosure of financial instruments information. 
Hafiz (2003), as cited in Hassan et al. (2012), was the earliest study found. Hafiz (2003) 
provided evidence relating to the relationship between the extent of derivative financial 
instruments disclosure and two specific company characteristics: company size and the level 
of foreign activities. A disclosure index, based on MASB’s ED 24 (Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentations), was used to measure the level of voluntary derivative 
disclosures. The study found that the level of voluntary disclosures among companies with 
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a high percentage of foreign subsidiaries was low when compared to companies with a low 
percentage of foreign subsidiaries. Furthermore, there was no difference in the level of 
voluntary disclosures of derivative financial instruments with regard to companies with 
substantial foreign sales as opposed to those with a low percentage of foreign sales; nor did 
an observed difference exist between companies with large assets and those with small 
assets. The argument has been made that this outcome resulted from conflicts of interest 
between the management and stakeholders.  
 
Hassan et al. (2012) extended the study by examining the disclosure quality among listed 
companies in Malaysia prior to and after MASB 24 was issued. Their findings suggested 
that the existence of a risk management committee, company size and profitability were 
associated with high quality financial instruments information. The study provided useful 
insight on the disclosure quality of financial instruments in Malaysia after the issuance of 
MASB 24 including disclosure of derivatives used for hedging activities. However, it could 
be argued that the results of this study might be out-dated because the study was conducted 
during the period when revised accounting standards for financial instruments were absent. 
Abdullah and Chen (2010) further examined the level of financial instruments disclosure 
under FRS 132 (Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure). They reported that, 
on average, the disclosure level of financial instruments information in Malaysia was still 
low. Their study revealed that the existence of RMC had no relationship with the extent of 
financial instruments disclosure due to the lack of an independent or effective RMC.  In 
addition, a few other studies have investigated other specific aspects of financial instruments 
disclosure in Malaysia. By emphasizing market risk disclosure, Othman and Ameer (2009) 
claimed that a large number of companies have complied with the requirement of FRS 132 
(Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure). However, they claimed that most of 
the Malaysian companies did not engage in hedging any type of market risk. Ismail and 
Abdul Rahman (2011) also presented high compliance of risk disclosure in accordance to 
mandatory accounting standards (i.e. FRS 132). They also reported that a significant 
relationship existed between corporate governance mechanisms and risk disclosure 
(including risk on hedging activities).  
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3.0 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 The existence of RMC 
According to Yatim (2009), RMC was established to support the internal audit function of 
board committees (i.e. BODs and audit committee) as well as to increase risk management 
effectiveness in companies. Its main role is to ensure that management of companies is 
closely monitored and not too involved in high risk activities. In addition, it ensures that 
firms provide high quality of financial instruments information in their annual reports, 
including hedging activities information (Hassan et al., 2012). Based on the agency theory, 
this study argues that the establishment of RMC will be able to safeguard the 
investors’/shareholders’ interests through its supervising responsibilities on the 
management’s actions on the use of derivatives for hedging. The presence of RMC as one 
of the internal control mechanisms on behalf of the investors/ shareholders can be seen as 
important to promote higher quality information and disclosure (Abdullah and Chen 2010; 
Birt et al., 2013). More reliable and relevant information can be expected with regards to 
information on hedging activities, both discretionary and mandatory. Hence, this study 
hypothesizes that: 
H1:  The extent of hedging activities information disclosure is positively associated with the 
existence of RMC.  
 
3.2 RMC size 
To perform its function, a board committee should be supported with adequate resources and 
authority (DeZoort et al., 2002; Ika and Ghazali, 2012). Previous studies have suggested that 
committee size impacts financial reporting and disclosure of information. A large committee 
is recommended in order to create a good intensity level and to be capable of providing a 
diversity of opinions and expertise (Bedard et al., 2004). This is because a larger committee 
size could offer more skills, knowledge, controls and various experiences (see Rashid et al., 
2012; Xie et al., 2003). However, arguably, a larger committee would be more likely to 
promote a free rider problem (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Additionally, having a large 
number of committee members may result in a lack of focus, and the committee members 
might tend to be less active (Dalton et al., 1999). A smaller board is claimed to be more 
effective in monitoring managerial practices and amending corporate disclosure practices 
than is a larger one. However, mixed evidence exists about this matter (for example, see 
Please cite this paper as: Abdullah, A. and Ku Ismail, K. N. (2015). Hedging activities information 
and risk management committee effectiveness: Malaysian evidence. Australian Journal of Basic and 
Applied Sciences 9(37), 211-219. 
 
7 
 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Htay et al., 2011; Raheja 2005; Said et al., 2013). In view of 
these studies, the number of members in RMC seems related to the quality of risk 
management as well as to disclosure of hedge activities information. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H2: The extent of hedging activities information disclosure is positively associated with 
RMC size.  
 
3.3 RMC independence 
Board composition is an important element in creating boards that are effective in 
monitoring risks and disclosing relevant information (Ng et al., 2013; Yatim, 2009). RMC 
is seen to be more effective and efficient if the membership comprises outside or independent 
members. This is because they can preserve the company’s best interests without promoting 
the interests of a particular class of shareholders over another or neglecting the interests of 
some stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Therefore, the 
expectation is that the involvement of independent directors in RMC can serve a control 
mechanism to enhance the committee’s effectiveness. For this reason, if the RMC is 
independent and plays an accountability and transparency role for the stakeholders, more 
and relevant information on hedging activities could be expected. This means that the risk 
management committee is valued for its expertise and independence. Independent directors 
will not be intimidated by the CEO’s power and will provide information directly to the 
board committee that will make decisions and implement company policy. Although the 
involvement of independent directors might influence the extent of hedge activities 
information disclosure, some evidence in many disclosure studies has demonstrated its 
significance (for example, see Leung and Horwitz 2004; Adznan and Puat Nelson, 2014). 
With regard to these facts, this study hypothesizes that: 
H3: The extent of hedging activities information disclosure is positively associated with 
RMC independence. 
 
3.4 RMC diligence 
To perform an oversight function on behalf of the BOD and audit committees, RMCs should 
be competent in order to ensure that the management (the agent) does not pursue 
opportunistic behaviour. A RMC that acts on behalf of the principals can ensure diligent, 
relevant and faithful disclosure if more meetings are conducted. This is because the RMC 
Please cite this paper as: Abdullah, A. and Ku Ismail, K. N. (2015). Hedging activities information 
and risk management committee effectiveness: Malaysian evidence. Australian Journal of Basic and 
Applied Sciences 9(37), 211-219. 
 
8 
 
can regularly serve as a check-and-balance on management activities and report any issues 
and conflicts that arise. Additionally, frequent meetings among RMC members can serve as 
a platform to share knowledge, information and produce a pool of expertise to provide high 
quality information (see Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Saleh et al., 2007). Laksmana (2008) 
supports this view. His study indicated that meeting frequency of the board and the 
compensation committee was positively associated with greater disclosure about executive 
compensation practices. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) found that the frequency of audit 
committee meetings was positively associated with management decisions to issue an 
earnings forecast. O’Sullivan et al. (2008) found that audit quality, measured also by the 
frequency of meetings of the audit committee, was positively associated with the decision to 
disclose forward-looking information in the annual report. It may therefore be said that the 
higher the number of RMC meetings, the more diligent RMC members will be to discuss 
issues relating to the risk management on hedging activities and more disclosure can be 
expected. Hence, the next hypothesis that will be tested is: 
H4: The extent of hedging activities information disclosure is positively associated with the 
number of RMC meetings.  
 
3.5 RMC gender diversity 
The board oversight function of RMC is seen to be more effective and efficient if the 
membership includes female directors. The argument is that involvement of female directors 
in RMC will increase board independence. This is because female membership can lead to 
improvement in the intensity of board monitoring and consequently result in the alignment 
of the management’s and the shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen 1983). Kang et al. 
(2007) study supported this view, positing that the presence of female directors helps 
increase board independence and provides the potential for a company to increase its level 
of information disclosure. Therefore, having female directors as members of a company’s 
RMC can be expected to enhance RMC’s effectiveness, and consequently has the potential 
to increase the level of disclosure on hedge activities information.  It is also argued that 
RMCs with female members increase efficiency and effectiveness in the decision-making 
process and results in higher participation (see Adams and Ferreira, 2004; Ibrahim and 
Angelidis 1994). Involvement of female directors is said to increase board effectiveness 
because they are more committed, diligent, well prepared, able to give different views during 
discussions and give more attention to audit, risk and oversight controls (Huse and Solberg, 
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2006; Stephenson, 2004). Several studies have shown that having female directors on the 
board has a positive effect on disclosure and company performance with respect to ﬁnancial 
and non-ﬁnancial information (e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Abdullah and Ku Ismail, 2013; Rao 
et al., 2012). As female directors possess special personal qualities such as high 
commitment, high participation, and good preparation, they are able to participate in 
complex debates and decisions about the hedging activities of the company. Hence, the 
present study hypothesizes that: 
H5: The extent of hedging activities information disclosure is positively associated with the 
proportion of female directors on RMC. 
 
3.6 RMC expert 
Several pieces of evidence have shown that qualification is one of the important elements 
for board effectiveness (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010; Francis et al., 2012; Ismail and Abdul 
Rahman, 2011). It is argued that the possession of an academic background, such as 
accounting and finance or industry-specific knowledge by board members, would improve 
the quality of financial reporting disclosure. In particular, it is able to reduce the information 
asymmetry (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010). One of the reasons is that qualified members 
can easily understand their company issues and problems as well as enhance the 
effectiveness of the committee (Roberts, et al., 2005). Hence, this study expects that the 
inclusion of more expert directors in RMC will improve the quality of financial reporting, 
particularly on hedging activities information. A study by Md Yusof (2010) supported this 
argument, whereby his finding showed that board committees with higher proportion of 
financial experts could enhance the quality of financial reporting. According to Lorsch 
(1995), the ability to govern also depends on the knowledge and skills owned by the board 
members. This claim is supported by Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) who asserted that to be 
effective in monitoring strategic decisions, directors should be individuals with relevant 
knowledge and expertise. The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement (Paragraph 15.09) also 
mandates that at least one board member of the audit committee must be a member of the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). Therefore, it is expected that RMC members with 
finance and accounting background would give more information regarding risk 
identification on hedging activities. This has led the study to generate the following 
hypothesis: 
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H6: RMC members’ qualification is positively associated with the extent of hedging 
activities information disclosure 
 
4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study investigates the extent of hedging activities disclosure and examines the influence 
of RMC and its effectiveness in two separate models of statistical test. The first model 
initially examines the extent of hedging activities disclosure and the existence of RMC. The 
second model involves analysing the relationships between the effectiveness of RMC (i.e. 
characteristics) and the extent of hedging activities information disclosure. Section 4.1 
discusses the data sources and sample while sections 4.2 and 4.3 outline the variables 
measured and models used in both statistical tests respectively. 
 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
This study uses secondary data collected from two separate sources: DataStream and annual 
reports of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. Financial data (i.e. ROA, total asset and 
leverage) were obtained from Datastream, and data on RMC was gathered from annual 
reports. In the case where the RMC was established through an Audit Committee (AC), this 
study selected RMC characteristics based on AC characteristics. This process was assumed 
to be valid as the RMCs through ACs perform similar functions (see Birt et al., 2013). The 
sample comprises 300 large companies listed in 2013 on the main board of Bursa Malaysia 
based on their total assets1. This sample size was assumed to be sufficient because many 
previous financial instruments disclosure studies had shown that the number of companies 
drawn as sample is not based on any single rule (for example, see Abdullah and Chen, 2010; 
Lopes and Rodriques, 2007; Taylor et al., 2008). However, the original sample of 300 was 
reduced because not all the companies from the original sample used derivatives to hedge 
their financial risk exposure or did not have a RMC (see Table 1). The 2013 financial year 
was chosen because this was the third year in which Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 
(MASB) fully adopted accounting standards for financial instruments and made them 
mandatory for all Bursa Malaysia listed companies to follow. Thus, the time can be 
considered sufficient for companies to adopt the standard. 
                                                        
1 Companies in the financial industry such as banking, insurance, trust, closed-end funds and securities were 
excluded from the sample due to their nature of business and because they were governed via additional 
regulations (see Abdullah and Ku Ismail 2008; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) 
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Table 1 
Summary of sample selection procedure 
 
Selection Criteria No. of companies 
Total sample companies 300 
Companies which use derivatives for hedging 162 
Less: companies not having a RMC (45) 
Companies which use derivatives and have a RMC 117 
 
 
4.2 Measurement of Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the study is the extent of hedging activities information disclosure 
(EHAD). To measure this variable, a disclosure index was prepared as the proxy for the 
extensiveness of hedging activities information. The amount of hedging activities 
information captured was based on a 32-item template comprising a mandatory and 
discretionary disclosure score. The index was calculated by adding up all items disclosed 
divided by the total maximum number of disclosures determined. The formulation can be 
described as follows: 
 
 
    Note: Where EHADj = the extent of hedging activities disclosure for firm j 
 
 
Mandated disclosures on derivatives and hedging activities information were directly 
derived from MFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosure). Such disclosure items include 
all hedge accounting in MFRS 7 (paragraph 22-24) and other related hedging activities 
disclosure requirements. Discretionary (i.e. voluntary) hedging activities information 
disclosure on the use of derivatives was extracted and developed from the accounting 
literature. In this regard, three classes of relevant hedging activity information index were 
developed, comprising disclosure of Risk Management and Accounting Policy of Hedging 
Activities, Disclosure Effect of Hedging Activities on Financial Statement and Disclosure of 
EHADj = total number of hedging activities information disclosed 
 
  
total possible hedging activities information disclosures (32) – (non-
applicable items) 
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Risks Related to Hedge Activities. To avoid unsystematic evaluation processes and increase 
the reliability of the design disclosure checklist, this study further crosschecked the 
mandatory disclosure items with the PWC’s IFRS Presentation and Disclosure Checklist 
2012. The assumption of this study was that this checklist could be counted upon to be a 
good metric for measuring the level of disclosing hedging activities information as the 
checklist presents a practically tested auditing tool. The present study recognizes that the 
MFRS 7 standard’s requirements and the PWC’s Disclosure Checklist 2012 are identical. 
Many other researchers have used a similar procedure to study the extent of financial 
instruments disclosure and other financial reporting disclosures (e.g. Birt et al., 2013; 
Rahman et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2008).  
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
There are two separate independent variable measurements in this study: 1) the existence of 
RMC; and 2) the effectiveness of RMC. To measure the existence of RMC, this study gives 
a score of ‘1’ if a company established a RMC, otherwise ‘0’.  With respect to the 
effectiveness of RMC, the measurements are based on the characteristics of RMC in terms 
of size, independence, diligence, gender diversity and training. To measure RMC size, this 
study used the total number of RMC’s members active in the committee until the end of the 
financial year. This study considers someone to be a RMC’s member if the appointment as 
member was at least six months and above. Several previous studies have used the same 
rationale (e.g. Farinha and Viana, 2009; Ng et al., 2013).  RMC independence refers to the 
number of independent non-executive members on the RMC. The number of independent 
non-executive members will be divided by the total number of RMC’s members to generate 
a proportion (see Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011; Lopes and Rodriquez, 2007; Mangena 
and Pike, 2005; Ng et al., 2013). With regard to RMC diligence, this study uses the number 
of RMC meetings held throughout the financial year. To measure the gender diversity of the 
RMC, this study will operationalize a dummy variable to distinguish the existence of one or 
more female director/s from those that have none in the committee. A score of 1 will be 
awarded if the RMC has female directors as members of the RMC, and 0 otherwise. With 
regard to RMC expert, this study uses the proportion of RMC qualification based on the total 
number of RMC members with qualification divided by the total number of members sitting 
on the RMC (see Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011; Yatim, 2009). 
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This study identified four control variables that have been found to be related to disclosure 
of financial instruments in previous work, namely, company size, profitability leverage and 
auditor quality. Prior researchers have shown that that size of a company positively 
influenced the level of financial instruments disclosure (see Birt et al., 2013; Chalmer and 
Godfrey 2004; Hassan et al., 2012; Lopes and Rodriquez 2007; Taylor et al., 2008). They 
argued that large companies are expected to disclose more information on financial 
instruments. Hence, the present study expects that the larger the company size, the greater 
will the level of hedging activities information disclosure be. Following the example of 
Hassan et al. (2012), this study uses the natural logarithm of total assets to control the size 
effect on the extent of hedging activities information disclosure.  
 
With regard to profitability, Return on Asset (ROA) is used as a proxy to measure the 
profitability. This measurement has been used by several previous studies on financial 
instruments disclosure studies (for example, see Hassan et al., 2006; Wei and Taylor 2009). 
It is expected that the higher the profitability the greater the hedge activities information 
disclosure. The argument is that companies with high profitability tend to disclose more 
information in order to disseminate good news regarding their position and reputation as 
well as to increase management compensation. Several recent studies on financial 
instruments disclosure such as those of Hassan et al. (2012) and Birt et al. (2013) also 
suggested that leverage could also possibly influence the extent of financial instruments 
disclosure and the evidence suggests that leverage is positively associated with the extent of 
disclosure. Similar to their studies, Debt to Total Asset Ratio is used in this study as a proxy 
for leverage.  Moreover, previous studies on financial instruments disclosure have also 
showed positive relationships between the size of audit firms and the quality of financial 
instruments disclosure (see Birt et al., 2013; Hassan et al., 2012; Lopes and Rodriquez, 
2007). They argued that reputations of large audit firms are diminished if their clients 
provide low-quality annual reports and do not comply with the accounting standards 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Therefore, this current study also expects that larger audit 
firms tend to influence their clients to provide more and higher quality information 
particularly on hedging activities. 
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4.3 Model Specification 
To examine the association between the extent of hedging activities disclosure (EHAD), the 
existence of RMC and the effectiveness of RMC, this current study employs separate 
multiple linear regression models. The first model is to test the relationships between EHAD 
and the existence of RMC. The model is constructed as follows: 
 
EHADi = α+β1REXISTi  +  β2CSIZEi  + β3PROFi + β4LEVi  + β5AUDITORi + εi    
 
With regard to the effectiveness of RMC, the second regression model in this study tests the 
relationship between RMC characteristics and the extent of hedging activities information 
disclosure. The model is constructed as follows:  
 
EHADi = α+β1RSIZEi + β2RINDEi + β3RDILIi + β4RDIVERi + β5REXPERTi +  β6CSIZEi  
+ β7PROFi + β8LEVi  + β9AUDITORi + εi    
 
Table 2 
Computation of Variables 
Variable  Composition of variables 
EHAD : Total Score of information on hedging activities disclosure = 
company’s actual disclosure score/company’s total possible disclosure 
score 
REXIST : Dichotomous variable, 1 for company with RMC, 0 otherwise 
RSIZE : Number of RMC members at financial year-end 
RINDE : Proportion of independent non-executive members on the RMC   
RDILI : Number of RMC meetings during the financial year 
RDIVER : Dichotomous variable, 1 indicates the existence of female members in 
RMC, 0 otherwise. 
REXPERT : Proportion of RMC members with accounting or finance qualification. 
CSIZE : Log of total assets 
PROF : Return on assets (ROA) 
LEV : Debt to total assets ratio 
AUDITOR : Dichotomous variable, 1 if audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise 
ε   : Error term 
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5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Descriptive Results 
Descriptive results for the extent of hedging activities disclosure are shown in Table 3 below. 
As can be seen from the table, variation in the disclosure of hedging activities information 
existed among non-financial Bursa Malaysia listed companies. The mean scale for the extent 
of hedging activities information disclosure index was 0.7729 with a minimum value of 0.44 
and maximum value of 0.98. The results show that the extent of hedging activities 
information disclosure was quite high, and most companies seemed to comply with the 
requirement in MFRS accounting standards for derivatives and hedging activities disclosure. 
Although the score is quite high, it should be observed that only 48 out of 162 of the sampled 
companies chose to apply hedge accounting which reflects the overall disclosure scored on 
hedging activities information. This is because many of the sampled companies were 
affected by ‘Not-Applicable’ disclosure requirements. In this respect, we perceive that the 
richness of the information on hedging activities can still be considered insufficient. 
However, these ﬁndings compared favourably with the results of several previous studies on 
Malaysian financial instruments disclosure (e.g., Abdullah and Chen 2010; Hassan et al., 
2012; Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011). On average, these studies reported that the 
percentage of the disclosure score ranged from 64 per cent to 78 per cent.  
 
Table 3 below also indicates the largest level of disclosures were mandatory disclosure on 
‘policy notes’ and ‘risk related to hedging activities’, where companies disclosed, on 
average, 97 per cent and 74 per cent respectively. The mandatory disclosure means score of 
‘Disclosure Effect of Hedging Activities on Financial Statement’ was only 31 per cent. On 
the other hand, Table 3 also shows that the discretionary (i.e. Voluntary) amount of hedging 
activities information disclosure was still low for each disclosure category. However, 60 per 
cent of the companies voluntarily disclosed the impact of hedging activities on the statement 
of cash flow. In a broader view, this study demonstrates room for improvement in the 
disclosure of hedging activities information. This is because such voluntary disclosures 
tended to be inconsistent across the companies, and this inconsistency can make it 
challenging for users of financial statements to compare derivatives usage for hedging, risk 
exposure, and risk management practices across companies. 
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 Table 3 
 Descriptive Statistics: Hedging activities information disclosure (Panels A and B) 
 
Panel A: Adoption of Hedge Accounting (N=162) 
 No of Firms % 
Those that apply hedge accounting 48 30 
Those that do not apply hedge accounting 114 70 
Panel B: Disclosure of Hedging activities information (N=162) 
 
Risk Management and 
Accounting Policy of 
Hedging Activities 
Disclosure Effect of 
Hedging Activities on 
Financial Statement 
Disclosure of Risks 
Related to Hedging 
Activities 
Total 
disclosure 
score  
(EHAD) 
M
a
n
d
a
to
ry
 
V
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 
M
a
n
d
a
to
ry
 
V
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 
M
a
n
d
a
to
ry
 
V
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 
Mean .9658 .3750 .3079 .6015 .7415 .3162 .7729 
Std. Deviation .09230 .23938 .45590 .41350 .31815 .24246 .15226 
Minimum .50 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .44 
Maximum 1.00 .83 1.00 1.00 1.00 .80 .98 
 
 
Table 4 below shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables in this study. As 
seen in Table 4, Panel A shows that 72 percent out of 162 companies that used derivatives 
had established a RMC. Compared to a study conducted by Hassan et al. (2012), it can be 
noted that many Malaysian companies were concerned about having a RMC as part of their 
internal control mechanisms although its establishment is still voluntary in Malaysia, 
especially for non-financial companies. Panel B exhibits the descriptive results of the 
attributes of RMC effectiveness. The RSIZE had a mean of 3.83 members (approximately 
4) and had a standard deviation of 1.132. The largest RMC had 9 members and the lowest 
was 2. The mean 0.7082 for RINDE indicated that, on average, the number of independent 
directors in RMC was slightly higher than non-independent directors. In other words, RMCs 
in Malaysia have a balanced composition in general, although such balance is voluntary in 
nature. Based on the sample, the highest RMC comprised all independent directors, while 
the lowest was 0. On average, RMCs conducted meetings four times yearly; however, one 
company did not conduct any RMC meeting at all. The highest number of meetings among 
the sampled companies was 12 times. It also can be observed the presence of female directors 
in RMC is about 0.32 per cent (i.e. RDIVER), meanwhile the mean for REXPERT is 0.61 
percent, representing the proportion of RMC members with accounting or finance 
qualification.  
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Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics: Independent variables 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on the existence of RMC (N=162) 
Categorical variables Frequency  No. of 
Companies 
Percentage 
(%) 
REXIST 
Yes 117 72 
No 45 28 
AUDITOR 
Yes 121 75 
No 41 25 
Continuous Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
 CSIZE 14.5456 1.41529 12.43 18.41 
 PROF 2.4904 1.07581 .50 7.76 
 LEV 4.7880 1.75123 .10 7.87 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on  the effectiveness of RMC (N=117)  
Categorical variables Frequency  No. of 
Companies 
Percentage 
(%) 
AUDITOR 
Yes 91 78 
No 26 22 
RDIVER 
Yes 37 32 
No 80 68 
Continuous Variables Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
RSIZE 3.83 1.132 2 9 
RINDE 0.7082 .34945 0.00 1.00 
RDILI 4.01 1.887 0 12 
REXPERT 0.6109 .23028 .00 1.00 
CSIZE 14.8927 1.43135 12.43 18.41 
PROF 2.3559 1.16062 0.49 7.76 
LEV 4.8722 1.70329 0.10 7.65 
 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
Table 5 below exhibits the results of regression analysis between the disclosure of hedging 
activities information and the existence of RMC. The results show that the existence of RMC 
is positive, but does not significantly influence the extent of hedging activities information 
disclosure. Consistent with Abdullah and Chen (2010), the existence of RMC can be 
presumed as not actively pressing the company to disclose related information on hedging 
activities and this may be due to a lack of committee effectiveness. According to Birt et al. 
(2013), most of the companies established RMC through Audit committee (i.e. sub-
committee). Therefore, the mixed role played by RMC members may weaken the 
committee’s function because they performed similar function. Since RMC is commonly 
established by the board in the company and voluntary in Malaysia (see Hassan et al., 
Please cite this paper as: Abdullah, A. and Ku Ismail, K. N. (2015). Hedging activities information 
and risk management committee effectiveness: Malaysian evidence. Australian Journal of Basic and 
Applied Sciences 9(37), 211-219. 
 
18 
 
2012;Yatim, 2009), we believe that the interaction between RMC and the board as well as 
the Audit Committee may affect the effectiveness of RMC, and eventually influence the 
disclosure level. This is because the ultimate power of management decision is still under 
their dominance. 
 
Table 5 
Summary of the multiple regression results- The existence of RMC 
Note: ***Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level, **signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *signiﬁcant at 0.1 level. 
 
Table 6 below presents the outcomes of the regression analysis between the disclosure of 
hedging activities information and the effectiveness of RMC (i.e. characteristics). Table 6 
shows that RINDE (t value = -1.887) had a significant and negative relationship with the 
extent of hedging activities disclosure, at p < 0.1. This finding indicates that independent 
directors in RMC do not influence the extent of hedging activities information disclosure. It 
seems that independent directors did not contribute their experience, skills and knowledge 
towards increasing the information on hedging activities. As hinted by the literature, an 
independent director does not always play an active role in supervising the management as 
directors often rely on the management for information due to their busy schedules and 
commitment to other activities (Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011). Another possible 
explanation is that the independent directors may have a relationship with the management 
connected with their appointments as a director and long period of experience in the 
company. As a result, their decision-making may be influenced by the management because 
their appointment as director was due to their relationship with the company. 
 
Model 1 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. 
SE t Sig. VIF 
(Constant)  -0.397 0.169 -2.351 0.020  
REXIST + 0.050 0.037 1.361 0.175 1.172 
Control Variables       
CSIZE  0.059 0.012 4.832 0.000*** 1.265 
PROF  0.006 0.015 0.411 0.681 1.058 
LEV  0.016 0.009 1.749 0.082* 1.083 
AUDITOR  0.016 0.036 0.447 0.655 1.079 
R2  0.228                        P value             0.000  
Adjusted R2 0.203                        N                      162 
F statistic  9.217                        
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Table 6 
Summary of the multiple regression results- RMC characteristics 
Note: ***Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level, **signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, *signiﬁcant at 0.1 level. 
 
Even though the results of this study support the hypothesis that the presence of more 
independent directors in RMC does not influence the level of hedging activities disclosure, 
this result should be viewed with caution given the small number of non-financial listed 
companies having a standalone RMC in the sample. Moreover, results from Table 6 also 
show that RDILI had a significant and positive relationship with the extent of hedging 
activities information disclosure, at P < 0.01. This indicates that infrequent RMC meetings 
are likely to be related to a low level of hedging activities disclosure. However, RSIZE, 
RDIVER, and REXPERT were found to be insignificant in this study.  
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Hassan et al., 2012; Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011; 
Lopes and Rodriques, 2007; Taylor et al., 2008; Wei and Taylor, 2009), company size 
(CSIZE) was found to be related to the extent of hedging activities information disclosure. 
Based on agency theory, this finding may be due to the fact that large firms incur lower 
information-processing costs as well as higher political costs than do small firms, thereby 
encouraging large firms to disclose more information. For example, Ng et al. (2012) claimed 
that large companies are more likely to operate internationally and therefore be subjected to 
market risks associated with foreign currency and interest rate fluctuations, resulting in the 
Model 2 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. 
SE t Sig. VIF 
(Constant)  -0.437 0.200 -2.181 0.031  
RSIZE + 0.016 0.016 0.997 0.321 1.087 
RINDE + -0.108 0.057 -1.877 0.063* 1.289 
RDILI + 0.030 0.010 2.976 0.004*** 1.121 
RDIVER + -0.047 0.040 -1.178 0.241 1.092 
REXPERT + -0.021 0.087 -0.242 0.810 1.267 
 
Control Variables 
      
CSIZE  0.054 0.014 3.960 0.000*** 1.238 
PROF  0.017 0.019 0.915 0.362 1.111 
LEV  0.022 0.011 2.032 0.045** 1.111 
AUDITOR  0.037 0.044 0.835 0.405 1.083 
R2  0.273                       P value             0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.212                       N                      117 
F statistic  4.470                        
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need to deal with such disclosure. The results of this study provide limited support for the 
notion that company performance (PROF) has an impact (p < 0.1 in the positive direction). 
One factor that could help explain this is that the impact of global systemic economic crisis. 
The recovery planning after the crisis may have affected the performance of the sampled 
companies during the period of this study. The prediction that disclosure of hedging 
activities information was positively related to financial risk (i.e. leverage) was supported 
for both models. The result is consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Birt et al., 2013; 
Hassan et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2008; Wei and Taylor, 2009), which found that the level 
of fair value, financial instruments and risk management disclosures, under a mandatory 
regime pursuant to IAS32, were related to leverage levels. The extent of disclosure increases 
with increasing financial risk, wherein companies with higher leverage increase disclosure 
to reduce potential agency costs associated with external funding and their asset 
replacements. With regard to audit quality (AUDITOR), the present study found that the use 
of Big 4 audit firms did not significantly influence the extent of hedging activities disclosure 
on both models. 
 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics indicate that multi collinearity did not exist in 
both models because tolerance values were close to 1 and VIF values were less than 10. The 
hypothesised RMC existence, its characteristics and control variables (i.e., company 
performance (PROF), financial risk (LEV) and auditor quality (Big 4), explain  for about 20 
percent of the variation in the level of hedging activities information disclosure in both 
models, which are relatively low. Although the adjusted R2 in both models is low, these 
findings are consistent with previous studies, which pointed out that a low R2 is common in 
corporate governance research (for example, see Adznan and Puat Nelson 2014; Birt et al., 
2013; Ng et al., 2013; Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011).  
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the extent of hedging activities information disclosure on the use of 
derivatives of Bursa Malaysia Main Market listed companies. In general, the descriptive 
results show that the extent of hedging activities information disclosure was quite high, 
which indicates that companies tend to comply with the MFRS accounting standards for 
financial instruments. Although the majority of the companies comply with the MFRS 
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accounting standards, this study only found approximately 30 per cent of the companies’ 
sampled chose to apply hedge accounting. One potential reason for this is perhaps that the 
application of hedge accounting is optional in nature according to the MFRS accounting 
standards for financial instruments, which leads Malaysian companies to accept choices. 
Due to this, this study perceives that the transparency and richness of the information 
regarding the utilization of derivatives on hedging activities is still insufficient. As a 
consequence, users of the financial statements (especially investors) may be misled and 
cannot fully analyse, understand or assess the character and impact of the companies using 
derivatives for hedging their financial risk exposure (see Ameer et al., 2011; Papa and Peter 
2013). However, there are some space and ways for an improvement of voluntary hedging 
activities information disclosure among Malaysian companies as to enhance the quality 
information. 
 
This study also examines the relationships between the existence of RMCs and the extent of 
hedging activities disclosure. The analysis indicates that the presence of RMC appears to be 
linked positively to the extent of hedging activities information disclosure as a corporate 
governance internal control mechanism. However, it is not significant. This study also 
analysed the effectiveness of RMC (i.e. Characteristics) in terms of its size, independence, 
diligence, diversity and expertise. Based on the results of the analysis, the composition of 
independent directors in RMC negatively affects the level of hedging activities disclosure 
while the number of meetings conducted positively affects the level of hedging activities 
information disclosure. Consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Abdullah and Chen 
2010, Birt et al., 2013), the results reveal that the mere presence of RMC is not enough to 
explain more disclosure towards financial instruments information particularly on hedging 
activities. Its effectiveness is something that needs to be considered and emphasized 
especially in incorporating RMC as part of the corporate governance mechanism. Although, 
the findings of this study may provide some meaningful insights to regulators and 
policymakers, especially towards the presence of RMC and its characteristics, the evidence 
provided by this study may be considered to be small, at least from an international 
perspective. Therefore, future studies may be extended to cover more companies or other 
companies in emerging economies to fill the knowledge gap and create a more thorough 
analysis.  
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